UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/23462
23 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the text of a Decision of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, the text of a Declaration of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria and the text of a Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria.

I would very much appreciate it if you would have this letter and the addenda thereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Svetlomir BAEV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I

Decision dated 15 January 1992 of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria

The Government of the Republic of Bulgaria recognizes the independence of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Our position is based on the approach of equality in treatment of the former Yugoslav republics and the criteria for their recognition adopted by the European Community. By the simultaneous recognition of all four former Yugoslav republics, we reiterate the aspiration of the Republic of Bulgaria to support the democratic process, peace and stability in the Balkans, in conformity with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe.

Annex II

Declaration dated 15 January 1992 of the President of the Republic of Bulgaria

Dear Compatriots,

Today, 15 January 1992, the Republic of Bulgaria decided to recognize the independence of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. This decision was taken in the spirit of the Report of the Commission on Arbitration of the European Community, headed by the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of France, Justice Robert Badinter. It is an expression of the principled policy of Bulgaria, which recognizes the right of free and democratic self-determination of all peoples, including their right to establish sovereign and independent States.

Our decision is yet another evidence of Bulgaria's persistent aspiration to act as a stabilizing factor in the Balkans and to contribute to the genuine unification of Europe, based on the principles of international law and the values of democracy. In this, Bulgaria's national interests are fully in harmony with the goals of modern European politics.

Our position is a logical result of our overall attitude towards the crisis west of our borders; it is a position that the Bulgarian State has upheld on many occasions. We are convinced that this decision is an important step to an even closer cooperation with all our neighbours, towards even closer integration within the framework of the CSCE. It is an intrinsic characteristic of our new foreign policy, one that Bulgaria will pursue in the future.

I am convinced that the Bulgarian people and all political forces support the Decision of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria.

Annex III

Declaration dated 17 January 1992 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria in connection with the decision of the Bulgarian Government on the recognition of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina

In its policy, the Bulgarian Government determines as its main objective the development of good relations with all countries and, naturally, first and foremost with its neighbours. Bulgaria sees it as its special obligation and responsibility towards Europe not to exacerbate, but rather, to assist for the settlement of problems in the Balkan region.

Guided by this understanding, the Bulgarian Government, by its decision on the recognition of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared once again its will to respect the existing borders, and that it has no territorial claims towards any State. This policy conforms with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe.

The recognition of the republics is based on respect of the lawful interests of the people living on their territories, of their legitimate will for State sovereignty, and of their right to determine on their own the relations among themselves and with other States. This has also been the approach adopted by Bulgaria as regards the republic of the former Soviet Union.

Democratic Bulgaria is persistently striving to pursue a European policy in the Balkans; it will carry out its actions in full view of the general positive processes in the continent in which the European Community plays an important role. The Bulgarian Government adopted the European Community's approach of equality in the treatment of the Yugoslav republics and the EC criteria on their recognition, while also taking notice of the position of the Commission on Arbitration. Future steps towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with the republics will be made in conformity with the decisions to be made within the framework of the European Community.

The Bulgarian Government believes that such a position will contribute to stability in the Balkans as part of a new Europe.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with reference to the Secretary-General's Note SCPC/8/91 (1) of 16 December 1991, and upon the instructions of his Government, has the honour to reply as follows:

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has fully complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 724 (1991) and in particular with paragraph 6 (a) thereto. Administrative instructions have been issued to the competent authorities in the United Republic of Tanzania drawing their attention to the need to adhere strictly to the provisions of resolution 724.

92-03033 3023d (E)

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S/23464
23 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 17 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's Note No. SCPC/8/91 of 16 December 1991 on implementation of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) concerning complete and general embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

This is to inform that Uganda does not produce or export any weapons or military equipment. Neither has Uganda given any authorization for transit across or from its territory for defence equipment bound for Yugoslavia.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations appreciates this opportunity to comment on the implementation of resolution 713 (1991).

92-03039 2943j (E)

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S/23465
23 January 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

NOTE VERBALE DATED 21 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note No. SCPC/8/91 dated 16 December 1991, has the honour to inform him that the United Arab Emirates has taken the necessary measures to ensure the full implementation of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991.

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S/23466
23 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note dated 16 December 1991, has the honour to state that the Government of Brazil strictly abides by the provisions of Security Council resolution 713 (1991), which calls for a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

In this connection, please find enclosed the text of Presidential Decree No. 411, enacted on 3 January 1992 by President Fernando Collor and published in the Official Register on 6 January, whereby the Brazilian authorities are obliged to ensure compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 731 (1991).

Annex

Presidential Decree No. 411 enacted by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil on 3 January 1992 concerning the implementation, within the national territory, of Security Council resolution 713 (1991)

The President of the Republic, by the powers invested in him by article 84 (IV) of the Constitution and in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, proclaimed by Presidential Decree No. 19,841 of 22 October 1946, hereby decrees that:

Article 1: The Brazilian authorities shall be obliged to comply, in respect of their several competences, with the provisions of resolution 713 (1991), particularly its paragraph 6, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 25 September 1991, the text of which is attached herewith, which determines a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

Article 2: The present decree shall enter into effect on the date of publication.

Done in Brasilia, on the third day of January nineteen hundred and ninety-two.

(Signed) Fernando COLLOR

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S/23467
23 January 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BENIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Benin to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the United Nations and has the honour to transmit to it below the message of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Benin, concerning the situation in Yugoslavia - paragraph 5 (a) of Security Council resolution 724 (1991):

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the text of Security Council resolution 724 (1991) on the situation in Yugoslavia which you transmitted to me.

The Republic of Benin remains deeply concerned about that situation, which is not only resulting in terrible suffering for the people of Yugoslavia but also constitutes a major threat to international peace and security.

I reaffirm the support of the State of Benin for any endeavour to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution that will ensure that peace and security are restored in Yugoslavia.

Benin greatly appreciates all efforts by the international community and the United Nations in general, and by you in particular, to bring to an end the fratricidal conflict between Yugoslav communities.

The Republic of Benin therefore welcomes the decision to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia contained in Security Council resolution 713 (1991).

I wish to inform you in this connection, in response to paragraph 5 (a) of Security Council resolution 724 (1991), that Benin does not maintain any relations with Yugoslavia that could lead to the provision of weapons and military equipment to that country.

(Signed) Théodore HOLO"

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General Assembly Security Council

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A/46/852
S/23468
23 January 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 20
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Application of the Republic of Moldova for admission to membership in the United Nations

Note by the Secretary-General

In accordance with rule 135 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith the application of the Republic of Moldova for admission to membership in the United Nations, contained in a letter dated 17 January 1992 from the President of the Republic of Moldova to the Secretary-General.

ANNEX

Letter dated 17 January 1992 from the President of the Republic of Moldova addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Moldova and in my capacity as head of State and Government, I have the honour to apply for admission of the Republic of Moldova to membership in the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would convey this application to the Security Council and the General Assembly at their forthcoming meetings.

To this end, I append hereto the text of the declaration made in accordance with rule 58 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and with rule 134 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Declaration

In connection with the application by the Republic of Moldova for admission to membership in the United Nations, I have the honour to declare, on behalf of the Republic of Moldova and in my capacity as its President, that the Republic of Moldova accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to fulfil those obligations.

Mircea SNEGUR
President of the Republic
of Moldova

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Security Council

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S/23469
23 January 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 23 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GUINEA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as Chairman of the African Group for this month, I have the honour to transmit a document on the situation in Somalia for circulation as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Zaïnoul Abidine SANOUSSI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement of 18 December 1991 by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity concerning the situation in Somalia

[Original: English]

I continue to be gravely concerned at the continuing fratricidal fighting in Somalia. The senseless fighting, which shows no sign of abatement, serves no purpose beyond the perpetration of more human suffering and deaths. The callous disregard to the sanctity of human life, which continues to graphically manifest itself in the fighting, has further compounded the conflict by fanning the tensions and divisions among the Somali people and undermined the prospects for a peaceful settlement. In this respect, every additional day of fighting only leads to more indiscrimate killing of innocent men, women and children. It complicates further the problem, aggravates division with its attendant human suffering and sows seeds of deeper confusion. No differences whatsoever, much less political differences can justify the random and wanton killings we are now witnessing in Mogadishu.

The most urgent task at hand is to bring to a speedy end the mayhem and carnage now raging in Mogadishu. In this regard, both parties involved in this fighting have particular responsibility to ensure that there is an immediate cease-fire and normalcy is restored to the city and thus paving the way to dialogue and a peaceful resolution to the conflict. I would like to make a solemn appeal to President Mahdi of The Interim Government and General Aedeed to exercise leadership and put an end to violence and self-destruction which is being visited on the Somali people.

I also wish to appeal to the international community, the African Governments and especially the leaders of the countries of the region to use their influence and leverage to encourage the parties to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue. I would equally wish to appeal, once more, to the international community at large to respond to the very urgent humanitarian needs of the victims of the conflict in all parts of Somalia by providing assistance especially of food and medicine.

I want to firmly reiterate the disposition of the OAU to do all possible to facilitate a speedy end to the fighting and to bring about a lasting settlement of the conflict in Somalia. Accordingly, I remain ready to facilitate a meeting between all the parties involved and with whom I have been in contact, in the course of the last months, with a view to elaborating a framework for constructive dialogue.

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S/23470
23 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3034th meeting of the Security Council, held on 23 January 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "Admission of new Members", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the members:

"It is a great honour for me to express, on behalf of the members of the Council, our congratulations to the Republic of Kazakhstan on the decision which the Council has just taken to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of Kazakhstan to membership in the United Nations.

"This is indeed an historic occasion. The admission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations, and its fulfilment of all relevant obligations, will help to consolidate the positive developments that the world has witnessed in the last few months. The significance of Kazakhstan's admission to this Organization is clear to all. I have no doubt that it will have an important contribution to make in every area of United Nations work.

"The members of the Council are confident that Kazakhstan, as a peace-loving State that is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, will contribute actively and constructively in upholding the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

"We look forward to welcoming Kazakhstan among us at the United Nations."

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S/23471
24 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AND DEPUTY AND ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES OF VENEZUELA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 9 January 1992 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela stating that Mr. Diego Arria has been appointed representative of Venezuela on the Security Council, Mr. Victor Rodríguez deputy representative, and Miss María Eugenia Trujillo and Mr. Miguel Manrique alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

92-03184 3031e (E)

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Security Council

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S/23472
24 January 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Ahmad Hussein, dated 23 January 1992, to which is annexed a report containing a comprehensive review of the measures implemented by Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991), with translations of both.

I should be grateful if you would have the letter and the report annexed thereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sabah Talat KADRAT
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

[Original: Arabic and English]

His Excellency
Sir David Hannay,
President of the Security Council,
United Nations,
New York

It is necessary to recall that the Security Council adopted resolution 661 (1990), imposing comprehensive and iniquitous economic sanctions against Iraq on the basis that Iraq had failed, at the time, to comply with resolution 660 (1990) connected with the events that had taken place since 2 August 1990.

However, in spite of Iraq's acceptance of the Council's resolutions, including resolution 660 (1990), the Security Council, by adopting resolution 687 (1991), not only maintained the economic sanctions, but also added new conditions, not contained in resolution 661 (1990), for the sanctions to be lifted. This was done under pressure from countries which had participated in the military aggression against Iraq, in order to achieve political objectives which bear no relation to the United Nations Charter, international law or the principle of fairness.

In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General on 6 April 1991, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq made clear the view held by Iraq regarding resolution 687 (1991). At the end of the letter the Minister pointed out that while wishing to go on historical record registering its principled and legitimate legal reservations before the conscience of the international community and international public opinion, Iraq finds itself left with no other alternative but to accept resolution 687 (1991).

During the period between the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) on 3 April and 31 December 1991, Iraq met a very large part of the conditions, restrictions and measures imposed upon it by resolution 687 (1991). The report enclosed herewith demonstrates through facts, figures and objective assessment what had been fulfilled in implementation of those conditions, restrictions and measures, which can be summed up as follows:

1. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction

The nuclear field

Iraq has taken a series of steps to implement the measures specified in resolution 687 (1991) in the nuclear field, and as follows:

(a) Iraq declared its commitment to, and implementation of, the requirements stated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), as follows:

First: Six letters from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, reaffirming Iraq's commitment to its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations;

Second: Sixteen letters and declarations issued by Iraqi official authorities stating Iraq's non-acquisition of nuclear weapons and non-production of such weapons or of any weapons-usable materials;

Third: Sixty-two letters containing Iraq's declaration of its nuclear sites and materials.

(b) By the end of 1991, the United Nations inspection teams made eight visits which altogether took 77 days, at an inspection rate of 2,120 man/days. The teams visited more than 50 sites, less than half of which were sites already declared by Iraq itself. The other sites were inspected by the teams on the basis of false intelligence information, and were then verified as non-nuclear sites after on-site inspection.

(c) Iraq declared all nuclear materials in its possession, which were:

First: 547,678 tons of natural uranium, in different forms;

Second: 50,066 kilograms of highly enriched fuel, of which the new type was removed from Iraq by the inspection teams;

Third: 1,850,629 kilograms of low enriched uranium;

Fourth: About 6 grams of plutonium removed from Iraq by the inspection teams;

Fifth: 6,004 tons of spent uranium.

The above-mentioned materials are all that Iraq has ever possessed. Iraq is in possession of no other nuclear materials whatsoever. The inspection teams have also verified that all Iraqi nuclear materials were made available to them and are now entirely in the possession of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(d) Iraq has declared the stages in its nuclear programme, which include:

First: The extraction of uranium from its ores;

Second: The purification and conversion of uranium compounds;

Third: The methods of uranium enrichment (chemical, electromagnetic and centrifugal);

Fourth: Manufacturing nuclear fuel;

Fifth: Nuclear reactors;

Sixth: The Electronuclear Plant Project;

Seventh: The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel;

Eighth: The processing of nuclear waste;

Ninth: Scientific research related to the programme;

Tenth: Agricultural and medical applications of isotopes;

Eleventh: Nuclear safety, engineering support and staff training;

Twelfth: Equipment/components related to the programme, their locations and quantities.

(e) Iraq presented to the inspection teams a lot of data and documents at their request. According to IAEA reports, the documents submitted were in excess of 60,000 pages.

(f) The inspection teams have destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all the equipment/components they deemed covered by their tasks.

(g) The Iraqi side extended all facilities requested by the different inspection teams, in addition to providing administrative and logistic services.

In view of the above, and as demonstrated in detail in the factual report attached hereto, it becomes clear that Iraq has taken all practical steps to implement the measures imposed by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in the nuclear field.

The field of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and biological research activity

In implementation of paragraph 9, section C, of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared all its information and data concerning chemical weapons, ballistic missiles for defence purposes, and the biological research programme which had been totally abandoned since the autumn of 1990. The declarations were made by Iraq during the period from 18 April to 2 August 1991. The various inspection teams have verified on-site the credibility and factual nature of the Iraqi declarations. In their press statements, the heads of the various teams have themselves recognized the responsible manner in which Iraq provided the facilities required for the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

(a) Ballistic missiles and their ranges

The inspection teams visited all various sites and verified the Iraqi declarations. They also supervised the destruction of the missiles, their

mobile and stationary launchers, the support equipment and any significant parts related thereto.

(b) The field of chemical weapons

The Security Council Special Commission expressed understanding of, and support for, the Iraqi proposals to undertake the operation of destroying the agents and chemical weapons. As a first stage, the unfilled ammunition was destroyed. Work is in progress to prepare the requirements for the destruction operations under the supervision of the Special Commission. The inspection teams have verified the Iraqi declarations, on more than one occasion, and found nothing in them contrary to the above.

(c) The field of biological activity

The inspection teams have ascertained Iraq's total departure from and the fact that Iraq has no means of conducting any production, research or development activities in this field. The visit, conducted by the teams in the three fields of inspection, took them to vast areas of Iraq, including military camps, production sites, warehouses, airbases and desert areas. The inspection teams conducted aerial inspection by using United Nations helicopters. Most of this was done in surprise visits without prior notice. Still, the teams found nothing contrary to Iraqi declarations, although their work was further assisted by satellite and U2 reconnaissance.

The Iraqi side answered all written and verbal questions put to it in relation to the allegations about ballistic missiles and submitted all clarifications required, especially details about the numbers of missiles.

As regards the ongoing monitoring, the Iraqi side has supplied all the information and data required by resolution 687 (1991), in connection with missiles, chemical weapons and biological research work. This was communicated in a letter sent to the Special Commission on 19 November 1991.

In the light of the above, it becomes apparent that Iraq has taken all the measures required for the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991), and has relinquished all ballistic missiles in its possession and abandoned its biological research activity. The destruction of chemical weapons is being carried out in accordance with such plans as jointly agreed between the Iraqi side and the Security Council Special Commission.

It is to be concluded that, following the implementation of measures imposed by resolution 687 (1991) in the nuclear, chemical and ballistic missiles fields, the fundamental objective of the resolution, which is to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and of its capabilities to produce such weapons, has indeed been achieved.

Demarcation of boundaries with Kuwait

Paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) imposed several measures for demarcation of the boundaries with Kuwait. Iraq has participated in all four sessions of the meetings held by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Committee, which has discussed fundamental matters. In November 1991, the technical team visited all boundary areas it wished to see and surveyed and photographed those areas.

Iraq has not taken any action that would impede the measures of the United Nations, despite our clear position on this matter.

The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

In implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) and in observance of the United Nations Secretary-General's report on the establishment of a demilitarized zone and the immediate deployment of a United Nations Observation Mission (UNIKOM), Iraq has set up a Coordinating Committee with UNIKOM entrusted with the task of following up UNIKOM affairs in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A liaison body has also been established at Um Qasr for the same purpose. Prior to the deployment of UNIKOM forces, all military units had been withdrawn as deep inside Iraqi territory and as far from the demilitarized zone as is required. Assistance has been extended to facilitate the tasks of UNIKOM, which has also been supplied with all information related to the civil administration of the demilitarized zone under Iraq's responsibility. UNIKOM has also been granted full freedom of movement and communication, along with other rights, as well as the freedom of movement on land or in the air all over the said zone. The liaison body at Um Qasr notifies UNIKOM beforehand of any movement by Iraqi vessels in Khor Abdullah. An agreement has been reached between the Iraqi Government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the status, immunities and privileges of UNIKOM personnel, in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities. A UNIKOM headquarters has been established at Um Qasr, and a UNIKOM liaison bureau set up in Baghdad, all free of charge. A UNIKOM duty-free shop has also been opened at Um Qasr. At the request of UNIKOM, Iraq has agreed that UNIKOM may employ third-party international contractors to build surveillance points in the demilitarized zone, employ Iraqi technical staff and use Iraqi mechanical equipment free of charge. An agreement has been reached on a mechanism by which to notify UNIKOM of the violations committed by the Kuwaiti side and the coalition partners in the demilitarized zone. The number of such violations, during the period from 25 November to 22 December 1991, reached 226.

It is to be concluded from the above that Iraq has extended everything required to facilitate the work of UNIKOM and fully cooperated with the mission in order to ensure the success of its tasks and avoid any difficulties.

Return of Kuwaiti property

In implementation of section D, paragraph 15, of resolution 687 (1991), and in observance of the report of the Secretary-General, regarding the return of Kuwaiti property, and in accordance with the agreement reached with Mr. J. Richard Foran, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of coordinating the return of Kuwaiti property, four priorities were determined for the return of Kuwaiti property and resources, all of which have been fully implemented, as follows:

May 1991	One civil aircraft delivered in Amman, Jordan.
31 July 1991	One civil aircraft delivered at Al-Muthenna airport in Baghdad.
5 August 1991	3,216 gold ingots and amounts of coins and banknotes delivered at Arar in Saudi Arabia.
10 September 1991	Books belonging to the Central Library delivered at Arar.
16 September 1991	Museum items delivered in Baghdad.
17 September 1991	News Agency materials delivered at Arar.
20 October 1991	Museum items delivered.
13 November 1991	Nine large aircraft engines delivered through Habaniyah airport.
15 December 1991	Four Hawk training military aircraft delivered.
15 December 1991	Sixteen steel safes belonging to the Central Bank delivered.

In addition to the deliveries made, Iraq received a technical delegation, during December 1991, to examine the destroyed aircraft at Mosul and Muthenna airports. Iraq expressed its willingness to hand over Hawk missiles and equipment, along with other military equipment about which coordination was in process with Mr. Foran for delivery to be made in mid-January 1992.

It is to be concluded from the above that Iraq has returned the greater part of the property in question, expressed its willingness to return the remainder, and cooperated in earnest with the United Nations representative in order to accomplish this aspect. The delay and return of the remainder of the property has not been due to any reluctance on the part of Iraq but to United Nations measures and United Nations staff shortage. Iraq has in fact proposed that the delivery of returned property and equipment be done simultaneously at several points in order to expedite the return of the property.

Repatriation of Kuwaiti nationals

In implementation of section G, paragraph 30, of resolution 687 (1991), and in order to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, the Government of Iraq has taken the following steps:

The Iraqi authorities concerned have, since 4 March 1991, and in cooperation with the mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Baghdad, repatriated 6,518 Kuwaiti and other nationals. There are at present 3,905 Kuwaitis; they are not living in detention, but live freely in the country and have full access to the ICRC mission in Baghdad, where they registered their names and submitted their requests to return to Kuwait. The ICRC has communicated their requests to the Kuwaiti authorities, which have so far agreed to the return of only 400 of the whole number. We are still awaiting Kuwaiti approval for the rest to be repatriated.

On 17 December 1991, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a request to the ICRC mission in Baghdad in which the Ministry proposed that the ICRC prepare a complete implementation plan, to be agreed upon between Iraq and the coalition countries, for measures to be adopted in the search for Kuwaiti, Saudi, Iraqi and other nationals still missing, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

It is to be concluded from the above that Iraq has, for its part, implemented its commitments to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals carefully and in earnest, and has cooperated with the ICRC in this respect; but the Kuwaiti authorities still refuse to receive their nationals.

Excellency,

The campaign launched by certain States members of the Security Council, in relation to the extent to which the measures specified in resolution 687 (1991) have been implemented and to Iraq's intentions, is a biased campaign and at odds with the facts established in this report.

The United Nations missions dispatched to implement all the said measures have themselves acknowledged and stated in their reports that Iraq had cooperated with them in earnest and in a highly professional and practical manner. Except for the incidents deliberately created on two occasions by David Kay of the United States, a CIA man with political motives to justify aggression against Iraq and newfangled pretexts for the perpetuation of the iniquitous sanctions imposed against its people, the work of the United Nations missions bears no witness to any of the false claims made by those countries in their reports and statements against Iraq.

Those established facts and figures prove that the continued imposition of the sanctions against Iraq on the basis of resolution 687 (1991) does not have any legal or practical grounds. It is a purely political stand adopted by certain States members of the Security Council to achieve such ulterior

political objectives as neither resolution 687 (1991) nor any of the other resolutions, however iniquitous, accommodated or provided for.

The Security Council is called upon to take, in accordance with the very resolutions it adopted and with the objectives set out in those resolutions, an unequivocal decision for a total lifting of the economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq. As for Iraq which has always cooperated in implementing the measures specified in resolution 687 (1991), it shall continue to honour its commitment towards those measures.

Refrainment by the Security Council from lifting the sanctions, at the instigation of certain countries, will undermine the resolutions themselves and render them meaningless; and the Council will have to draw the right conclusions from such an eventuality.

Iraq calls upon the Security Council to look deeply and objectively into this matter, away from the political objectives sought by certain countries. Iraq also invites the Security Council to appoint a mission consisting of members with no special political pretexts or objectives against Iraq, to examine these facts and present its conclusions to the Council. Iraq is ready to receive any such mission interested in conducting an on-the-spot investigation of the facts. Iraq is also prepared to dispatch a high-level delegation to New York to discuss these facts with the mission proposed herein, and submit Iraq's views and position before the Security Council.

Kindly distribute this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Ahmed HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iraq

Enclosure

A factual report

of the measures taken by Iraq

in accordance with

Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. Demarcation of boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait

Paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) demanded "that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the 'Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters', signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations". Paragraph 3 of the resolution called on the Secretary-General "to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on the appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month".

Iraq's implementation of this measure

The measures taken by the Government of Iraq are as follows:

(a) Iraq has participated in all four sessions of the meetings held by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Committee.

(b) During the four sessions of its meetings, the Committee discussed fundamental matters. This was clearly stated by the Chairman of the Committee in his letter of 11 November 1991 to the Secretary-General to report on the work it had accomplished. The Chairman stated that the Committee had discussed fundamental matters during its four sessions.

(c) The technical team visited the boundary area in October 1991 and surveyed and photographed the area in preparation for the demarcation of the boundary.

2. The international observers (UNIKOM)

Paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdulla and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963.

In implementation of that paragraph and in accordance with the Secretary-General's report connected with it, Iraq has done the following:

(a) A body has been set up for the coordination with the United Nations observer team in order to follow up the affairs of UNIKOM in coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a view to extending to UNIKOM the cooperation that would help it carry out the task entrusted to it in the

demilitarized zone as well as facilitate its requirements. A liaison body has also been established in Um Qasr for the same purpose.

(b) All military units had been withdrawn from the Iraqi part of the demilitarized zone before the deployment of the observer forces therein. There is no longer any Iraqi military presence in the area.

(c) The requests submitted by Major-General Greindl and his staff to meet with Iraqi officials in the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Culture and Information and UNIKOM coordination commission have been granted, and assistance has been extended to facilitate UNIKOM in its tasks.

(d) At the request of the UNIKOM Chairman, the Observers Commission has been provided with the information connected with the civil administration of the Iraqi part of the demilitarized zone, which consists of:

(i) The number and locations of police stations and the personnel thereof;

(ii) The type of uniform worn by the members of the police units in the area;

(iii) The size of the population in the area and the demographic situation thereof;

(iv) The names of official departments in the two districts of Um Qasr and Safwan.

(e) The Iraqi authorities exercise all aspects of civil administration in the Iraqi part of the demilitarized zone, including the maintenance of law and order.

(f) At the request of the UNIKOM Chairman, border police forces have been instructed to control the types of weapons carried by their personnel in the demilitarized zone and to limit those weapons to pistols only.

(g) UNIKOM has been granted freedom of movement and communication, including the full freedom to move and land, in the air, and across the boundary line in the demilitarized zone, along with other such privileges and facilities necessary for the discharge of its tasks.

(h) The Um Qasr coordination body is to notify UNIKOM in advance of any Iraqi vessel movement in Khor Abdulla.

(i) An agreement has been reached between the Iraqi Government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the basis of the letters exchanged to arrange the UNIKOM status, immunities and privileges in accordance with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

(j) The Iraqi authorities have succeeded through incessant efforts to prevent civilians from collecting mines in the area. This whole question is now under control as agreed with the Chief Observer.

(k) A UNIKOM headquarters office has been established at Um Qasr, and a UNIKOM liaison bureau set up in Baghdad, all free of charge.

(l) At the request of the UNIKOM Chairman, it has been agreed that a UNIKOM duty-free shop be opened at Um Qasr.

(m) At the request of the UNIKOM Chairman, it has been approved that UNIKOM may employ third-party international contractors to build surveillance points in the demilitarized zone and provide the daily services needed by the observers.

(n) At the request of the Chief United Nations Observer, approval has been given for UNIKOM to appoint local staff at UNIKOM headquarters.

(o) At the request of the Chief United Nations Observer, approval has been given for UNIKOM to employ some Iraqi technical staff for the period requested and without pay.

(p) At the request of the Chief United Nations Observer, the Commission has been loaned mechanical equipment to be used by UNIKOM in the demilitarized zone free of charge.

(q) At the request of the Chief United Nations Observer, approval was given for official delegations and press teams to come via Kuwait to visit UNIKOM headquarters at Um Qasr and tour the demilitarized zone to see how UNIKOM tasks are being discharged. A passport office has also been set up at Um Qasr to provide its services to visitors.

(r) The Iraqi authorities concerned have responded favourably to the requests submitted by UNIKOM for the release of all United States, British, French, Kuwaiti and Saudi persons captured while entering Iraqi territory in the demilitarized zone without prior notice or approval by the Iraqi authorities.

(s) Work has continued for the body of coordination with the United Nations Observers to notify UNIKOM of all violations committed by the Kuwaiti side and the coalition partners in the demilitarized zone in order for UNIKOM to take the measures necessary for the prevention of such violations in the future. Those violations were also communicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the communications were published as documents of the Security Council. The Kuwaiti and coalition violations in the demilitarized zone were referred to by the Secretary-General in his report (S/23106) as well as in his weekly reports on UNIKOM during the period from 25 November to 22 December 1991. The number of the violations has reached 226.

3. Implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991)

In this respect, resolution 687 (1991) outlined the measures demanded from Iraq in four main fields. These four fields are listed below, as well as the measures of implementation taken by Iraq in this regard.

The nuclear field

Iraq's NPT obligations

Paragraph 11 of resolution 687 (1991) called upon Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iraq has fulfilled this in a letter, dated 18 April 1991, from the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, in which he stated that, "in accordance with the provision of paragraph 11 of resolution 687 (1991), the Iraqi Government reaffirms, once again, Iraq's unconditional commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of July 1968". Iraq also reiterated this commitment in a letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which the Minister stated that "Iraq reaffirms once again its total commitment to its international obligations, including those of the Safeguards Agreement signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

4. Non-acquisition or production of nuclear weapons

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) demands that Iraq shall agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above.

In implementation of this measure, Iraq has done the following:

(a) The Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 18 April, in which he wrote:

> "In accordance with the provision of paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq unconditionally agrees not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development or support facilities related to the above."

(b) This commitment was reaffirmed once again in a letter, dated 10 October 1991, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the Minister wrote: "I wish to reaffirm once again that Iraq stopped all its nuclear activities with the beginning of the aggression against it on 16 January 1991. Following the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), and in accordance with its obligations towards this resolution, Iraq decided to depart from its nuclear programme." The Minister added in his letter another paragraph stating that "The Iraqi

Government stresses once again that Iraq never sought to acquire nuclear weapons and that the political leadership of Iraq did not at any time take any decision to direct Iraqi nuclear research in progress towards the stage in which any type of nuclear weapons may be manufactured."

(c) The chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission had a meeting on 9 August 1991 with Dr. David Kay, head of the fourth inspection team, and gave him a comprehensive picture of the research work conducted by Iraq in the nuclear field. The chairman of the IAEC made clear to Dr. Kay the fact that the Iraqi programme was not what certain parties in the world had claimed it was: i.e. an attempt at acquiring nuclear weapons which might have got quite close to achieving its goal. The IAEC chairman also explained during the meeting why Iraq had turned to the operation of enrichment and abandoned the matter of building power reactors. The head of the fourth inspection team stated, during that meeting, that he had found the Iraqi side to be most cooperative and that he thought the findings of the fourth inspection team would be the beginning of the end towards assessing the size of the Iraqi programme. He also said that the Iraqi programme, in its present state, had nothing in it that might lead to, or help it move towards, the production of nuclear weapons.

(d) During the meetings of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, held on 6 May, 18 July and 20 September 1991, the Iraqi Governor at the IAEA submitted a detailed presentation of the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme in Iraq. Additional information reiterating this commitment was also contained in the address delivered by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations before the Security Council on 11 October 1991 and in the letter of 14 October 1991, sent by the head of the Iraqi side to his counterpart in the Seventh Nuclear Inspection Team. The latter document contained the following:

(i) Iraq's confirmation of its departure of the nuclear programme.

(ii) Studies and research had been conducted in relation to weapons, but no political decision had been taken to manufacture nuclear weapons; and all the research and studies conducted remained within the framework of laboratory scale and never directed towards the production of weapons. There was no programme whatsoever for the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.

5. Iraqi declarations of nuclear materials

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) also demanded that Iraq should submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within 15 days of the adoption of the resolution a declaration of the locations and amounts of all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials along with their components and facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled this measure through the following:

(a) The letters sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the IAEA, dated 18 April, 27 April, 7 July, 10 July, 12 July and 28 August. These letters contained information, tables and annexes including a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), whether subject or not to the IAEA safeguards systems. In addition, the letters contained answers to the questions raised by the IAEA together with lists of the equipment and locations of interest to the Special Commission and clarifications concerning the history and nature of the Iraqi nuclear programme which was devoted to peaceful purposes.

(b) Twenty-six letters addressed by the head of the Iraqi teams to his counterparts in nuclear inspection teams. These letters contained answers to the questions raised by the heads of the nuclear inspection teams or the IAEA.

(c) Three minutes concerning the submission of documents to the sixth nuclear inspection team, dated 20 and 23 September 1991.

6. Placing materials to exclusive control of IAEA

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq should place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA.

Iraq has fulfilled this measure through:

(a) The letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 18 April 1991, in which it is stated that "the Iraqi Government agrees to place all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials to the exclusive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(b) The submission of the materials covered by resolution 687 (1991) to the nuclear inspection teams which took the following measures:

(i) Placing all nuclear materials under IAEA seals;

(ii) Destroying the parts for destruction by the inspection teams;

(iii) Removal of fresh Soviet-made fuel above 20 per cent enrichment, plutonium and uranium (U-233) from Iraq;

(iv) Removal of two streak cameras from Iraq;

(v) Sealing all hot cells and rendering some of them harmless together with the manipulators.

7. Destroying materials, removing them or rendering them harmless

Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) also demanded that Iraq should accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 of the resolution, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of the items specified. This measure was fulfilled through:

(a) The letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 6 April 1991, conveying Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991);

(b) The letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 April 1991, in which the Minister stated that "the Government of Iraq accepts the measures stipulated in paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991)";

(c) During the period between 15 May and mid-November 1991, eight nuclear inspection teams visited Iraq. Except for the second and sixth inspection teams, which were both headed by David Kay, a United States intelligence officer, the teams discharged their tasks in the country with the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities concerned. The Iraqi side facilitated, for instance, the following services to those teams:

(i) Providing logistic facilities;

(ii) Providing medical and administrative services;

(iii) Providing technical services (assistance in the destruction of equipment/components);

(iv) Assisting in transferring fresh fuel (unburnt) out of Iraq;

(v) Gathering nuclear materials in one site (Al-Twaitha) in order to facilitate the task of verification and detection;

(vi) Providing headquarters to manage the on-site operations of the inspection teams;

(vii) Submitting documents and plans;

(viii) Gathering the destroyed and operational components and equipment at Al-Twaitha, and thus facilitating the verification process. The inspection teams themselves praised the Iraqi side for the cooperation extended, the detailed data and information presented, and the credible answers given in earnest to all questions raised by the teams.

As to the problems which occurred during the visits of the second and sixth nuclear inspection teams, these were caused by conduct of the head, and

certain members of those two teams, who kept creating difficulties to achieve such particular political objectives as would serve the countries they work for. The second nuclear inspection team insisted on conducting its work during the days of Holy Al-Adha (a sacred religious occasion and a public holiday). The sixth nuclear inspection team broke into administration premises belonging to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, stole documents containing personal data about IAEC personnel and sent the data to Washington and not to the Special Commission, as revealed in the 22 October 1991 issue of Liberation which quoted a French doctor and a member of the sixth team as saying that the head of the team, David Kay, had deliberately sought clashes with the Iraqi authorities in order to create a pretext for a new United States aggression against Iraq. It is worth noting here that the membership of the second and sixth nuclear inspection teams was 38 per cent and 68 per cent American, respectively. None of the other inspection teams had as high an American share of the membership as these two.

(d) The eight nuclear inspection teams which visited Iraq conducted visits to more than 50 sites in the various parts of the country. More than half of the sites inspected were not related to the nuclear programme. Below are the details of sites inspected by the teams and of the meetings held with the Iraqi side:

(i) The first nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 14 to 22 May 1991, and inspected three sites: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, and Tarmiyah.

(ii) The second nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 22 June to 3 July 1991, and inspected the sites of Al-Tuwaitha, Abu Ghraib, Al-Mussayab, the Vehicle Repair Unit, the Directorate of Supplies and Transport at Hasswa, Al-Rabee' Factory and Dijla Factory.

(iii) The third nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 6 to 19 July 1991, and inspected 21 sites, which were: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, Al-Suwaira (site No. 2) - destroyed equipment/components, the Security Institute, Al-Ishaqi Location 5 (equipment/components on display), Al-Razzaza (Al-Mijar and Qasr Al-Ikhaider), the artillery field at Al-Thirthar, the nuclear-power plant project in Tikrit, Al-Mussayab power plant, Al-Dawra power plant, the tank unit and electronics repair factory, the Akashat Mine, the General Establishment of Phosphate Fertilizers in Al-Qaim, Al-Qa'qa' Establishment, the Uqba bin Nafi' Establishment, Al-Nasr General Establishment, Badr General Establishment, Dijla factory, Al-Fajr site, Saladdin General Establishment and Saddam General Establishment.

Two scientific seminars were also conducted with this team in addition to two meetings, one with the Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and the second with the Vice-Chairman.

(iv) The fourth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 27 July to 10 August 1991 and inspected 22 sites, which were: Al-Tuwaitha site, Al-Jazira factory, Al-Sabounchiya railway station, the Saddam Dam, the Design Centre, Al-Rashdiya water plant, the Teachers Institute, the Physiotherapy Hospital, Al-Mansour Unit, the wool factory near Tarmiyah, the North Rashdiyah orchards, the Officers City (Zayoona), the Zayoona public shelter, Al-Atheer Centre, Al-Furat factory, Al-Qa'qa' Establishment, the Uqba bin Nafi' Establishment, the General Establishment of Heavy Engineering Equipment, Hateen Establishment, Badr Establishment, Al-Nasr General Establishment, Bilat-al-Shuhada' Plant and Al-Kisek Refinery.

Four scientific seminars were conducted with the team which also had a meeting with the IAEC Chairman and two meetings with the IAEC Vice-Chairman.

(v) The fifth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 14 to 20 September 1991 and inspected three sites: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, and the Geological Surveying Department.

(vi) The sixth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 22 to 30 September 1991 and inspected five sites, including an IAEC administration building in Baghdad (opposite Rasheed Hotel), Al-Khayrat Building, Al-Hilal industrial factory, the Training and Development Institute and an IAEC office in Baghdad.

(vii) The seventh nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 11 to 22 October 1991 and conducted inspections at 18 sites, which included: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, an IAEC administration building in Baghdad (opposite Rasheed Hotel), Al-Khayrat Building, Al-Talaa'i Scout Camp in Rashdiyah, Al-Qa'qa' establishment, Al-Furat factory, Al-Fajr factory, Al-Atheer Centre, Project 144- Al-Mustafa factory, the Air Force Explosives Centre, the Uqba bin Nafi' establishment, the Saladdin General Establishment, the Saddam General Establishment, the General Establishment of Heavy Engineering Equipment, Hateen Establishment, Badr Establishment and the Abu Skhair mine.

(viii) The eighth nuclear inspection team:

This team visited Iraq from 11 to 18 November 1991 and conducted inspections at 11 sites, including: Al-Tuwaitha, Jurf-al-Naddaff, the liquid nitrogen building, the Karkh water treatment plant, Al-Atheer Centre, Al-Qa'qa' General Establishment, Uqba bin Nafi' Establishment,

the General Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment, Hateen Establishment, Badr General Establishment, and Tarmiyah.

8. Halting all nuclear activities

The resolution of the Security Council demanded that Iraq should halt all its nuclear activities, except for the application of radio-isotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. Iraq has carried out this measure through the following:

(a) Between 24 July and 10 October 1991, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sent five letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the Minister made it clear that Iraq had departed from all nuclear activities, and that all its activities of the past had become practically and scientifically non-existent following the destruction inflicted upon the Iraqi nuclear sites during the aggression of the coalition forces.

(b) The Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission assured the head of the fourth nuclear inspection team that Iraq, owing to the destruction to which its scientific installations had been subjected, was no longer capable of continuing its scientific activities. The fourth team saw the destruction inflicted upon those installations and agreed that they could no longer be of any possible use.

(c) The inspection teams which visited Iraq did not communicate any activity contrary to Iraq's above-mentioned commitments.

9. Halting, transfer and destruction of materials and equipment

The resolutions of the Security Council demanded that Iraq should halt any operations regarding the transfer or destruction of any materials or equipment related to nuclear activities, without prior notice to, and approval of, the Special Commission. Iraq has complied with this demand through the following:

(a) The letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on 28 August 1991, in which the Minister declared that Iraq had since 28 June 1991, taken a decision to halt the transfer or destruction of any materials or equipment related to Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

(b) The nuclear inspection teams visiting Iraq themselves verified this measure, and agreement was reached with the third nuclear inspection team to transfer some equipment to other places, with a view to facilitating IAEA control over the equipment transferred under the supervision of members of the team. A quantity of yellow cake was transferred from the Tikrit site to Tuwaitha at the request of the seventh nuclear inspection team. The transfer operation was verified by the eighth nuclear inspection team. The seventh team also requested the transfer of quantities of Uranium Dioxide from

location D to location C within the Tuwaitha site. Lastly, Iraq requested the IAEA to transfer some liquid waste containing uranium from Al-Kisek site to Al-Jazira factory, but approval was not granted until the IAEA inspectors attended to oversee the transfer operation. Iraq works seriously to implement the measures connected with these activities, and the inspection teams visiting Iraq have not disclaimed or contradicted this fact.

10. The establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction

Paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991) states that the Security Council takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.

It is deeply regrettable that the Security Council totally ignored this paragraph and took no measure whatsoever for its implementation. Indeed, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 715 (1991), thwarted any movement towards the establishment of such a zone, until the implementation of the ongoing monitoring plan for Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991). Thus, the Security Council and in particular the countries dominating it allowed Israel to continue increasing its WMD arsenal undeterred.

Meanwhile, the Security Council has as yet regrettably failed to take the measures required for the implementation of its resolution 487 (1981) which demanded that Israel should place its nuclear installations under international safeguards, following Israel's unprovoked aggression against Iraq's Temmuz reactor, which was devoted to peaceful purposes.

The chemical aspect

11. Iraq's declaration of its chemical weapons

Paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq submit a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all chemical weapons and their stocks and related subsystems and components and all research and development facilities.

Iraq has declared, within the prescribed period, all the required information through letters sent to the Special Commission that contained:

(a) All kinds of chemical ammunition stocks and their storage locations and conditions, indicated by coordinates, as follows:

(i) 122 millimetre rocket ammunition with nerve agents amounting to 10,780 pieces distributed in various areas;

(ii) Aircraft bombs (1,776) distributed in various areas;

(iii) 155 millimetre artillery shells (12,634) distributed in various areas;

(iv) 30 warheads of Al-Hussein missiles;

(v) 120 millimetre mortar shells (20,000) type of agent (cs) tear gas. Declared, although not prohibited.

(b) All sites of production, quality control, mechanical workshops and filling.

(c) All research and development laboratories contained in four sites consisting of five laboratories on each site, together with one site which contains five analysis laboratories and one laboratory for chemical evaluation. All these sites were totally destroyed.

(d) All technical information related to chemical agents with their technical specifications and production methods. The various inspection teams were provided with detailed information on toxic chemical agents produced at Al-Muthanna State Establishment as well as those under research and development.

(e) Stocks of toxic chemical agents together with their storage conditions and sites as follows:

(i) Mustard agent stocks: 280 tons stored in 20-ton containers;

(ii) Nerve agent stocks: 75 tons stored in 2-cubic metre containers.

(f) All chemical, raw and intermediate material, together with their quantities and storage conditions.

(g) Quantities and locations of non-filled ammunition:

(i) 122 millimetre rockets of different types (45,000) totally destroyed in Al-Muhamadiyat stores as well as 3,000 undestroyed at Al-Muthanna Establishment.

(ii) Aircraft bombs (250 millimetre calibre): 5,000 totally destroyed in Al-Muhamadiyat, 500 bombs in Al-Muthanna Establishment.

(iii) Mortar 120 millimetre shells: 24,000 totally destroyed in the stores site in Al-Muhamadiyat.

(iv) Aircraft bombs type DB-2: 1,175 bombs totally destroyed in the stores site in Al-Muhamadiyat.

12. Destruction of chemical weapons

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of chemical weapons, all stocks of chemical weapons and all related subsystems and components and all research, development and support facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled all the required procedures set out in that paragraph through facilitating the task of the inspection teams in verifying the information provided by Iraq referred to in the previous paragraph. The inspection teams thereafter supervised the following procedures:

(a) The destruction of the non-filled chemical ammunition at the sites of Al-Muthanna State Establishment.

(b) The collection of all chemical ammunition from their various storage sites at Al-Muthanna Establishment in order to proceed to empty and then destroy them.

(c) The stock-taking, determining and sorting-out of all chemical toxic agents and gathering them at a site designated by Al-Muthanna State Establishment. After elaborate discussions of the Iraqi proposals concerning damaging and destruction of the chemical agents, the Special Commission agreed in principle to Iraq's practical participation in the destruction process. Therefore, the installation of equipment for destroying the chemical agents was started and successful tests were carried out in front of the experts of the Special Commission for the hydrolysis of nerve agents process.

The experts from the Special Commission praised Iraq's great cooperation to facilitate this process and for providing all human and material elements.

13. Undertaking not to develop chemical weapons

Paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire chemical weapons and all related systems and facilities. Iraq through the letter sent by the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General on 18 April 1991 unconditionally undertook not to use, develop, construct or acquire chemical weapons. The inspection teams that visited Iraq verified such undertakings when they inspected many sites all over Iraq which included military camps, warehouses, airbases and industrial facilities. Most of these visits were made in a sudden manner without prior notice. There were also aerial surveying operations carried out by United Nations helicopters and the spying United States aircraft (U2) which covered all parts of Iraq.

The Special Commission, nevertheless, has found nothing that contradicts Iraq's undertakings and declarations.

The following is a summary of the visits made by the chemical inspection teams to Iraq during the period 9 June to 1 December 1991:

(a) The first chemical inspection team, headed by Dr. Dunn, which visited Iraq from 9 to 15 June 1991. During the visit the team conducted a thorough inspection of Al-Muthanna State Establishment and found no discrepancy related to the Iraqi declaration. During the visit, the team was informed of other sites belonging to the Establishment (those of Fallouja 1, Fallouja 2 and Fallouja 3) whose activities were not related to chemical weapons, but limited to the production of agricultural pesticides and chlorine, and which have been virtually destroyed as a result of the enemy bombardment.

The Iraqi counterpart also informed the team of some equipment which had been transferred from Al-Muthanna Establishment to the site of the sugar factory in Mosul.

(b) The second chemical inspection team, headed by Colonel Peroz, from 15 to 22 August 1991, whose visits were assigned for several sites belonging to Al-Muthanna Establishment, i.e. Al-Fallouja sites (1, 2, 3) as well as Tammouz airbase and Al-Muthanna major site. The team did not find any discrepancy with the Iraqi declaration.

(c) The chemical weapons destruction experts team, headed by Mr. Johan Molander, which visited Iraq from 11 to 14 August 1991. The team discussed with the Iraqi counterpart Iraq's proposals on the destruction of chemical weapons at the site of Al-Muthanna Establishment.

(d) The third chemical inspection team, headed by Mr. Santesson which visited Iraq from 31 August to 9 September 1991. This team visited seven sites consisting of airbases, ammunition depots, workshops and training fields, to verify the Iraqi declarations. The team found no discrepancies with the Iraqi declaration despite the fact that the team required inspecting sites that have no relation with Al-Muthanna Establishment.

(e) The fourth chemical inspection team headed by Mr. Knapp, which visited Iraq from 31 August to 5 September 1991. The team supervised the destruction of the non-filled chemical ammunition at the major site of Al-Muthanna Establishment. The work was carried out in line with the inspection team's plan with no obstacles. The head of the inspection team lauded the cooperation extended by the Iraqi counterpart.

(f) The fifth chemical inspection team, headed by Mr. Van Zelm, which visited Iraq from 6 October to 9 November 1991, and conducted a thorough inspection of all material and ammunition at the site of Al-Muthanna Establishment.

(g) The sixth chemical inspection team, headed by Mr. Brunner, which visited Iraq from 22 October to 2 November 1991. The team visited and inspected six sites including an airbase and ammunition depot. Following these visits the team announced that it had found no activity that runs counter to Iraq's declaration and that no equipment or ammunitions had been transferred from their sites.

(h) The expert team for the destruction of chemical weapons, headed by Mr. Barrass, which visited Iraq from 12 to 15 November 1991. The team discussed with the Iraqi counterpart the Iraqi proposals on the destruction of the chemical weapons and expressed satisfaction with the Iraqi proposals which help achieve the purpose of destroying the stocks of ammunition and chemical toxic material under the supervision of the Special Commission. Professor Barrass agreed to the removal by the Iraqi side of all chemical ammunition from their present locations and gathering them at Al-Muthanna Establishment in preparation for their destruction and to begin the assembling of the incinerator designed for the burning of the mustard gas.

The joint biological-chemical inspection team, which visited Iraq from 18 November to 1 December 1991. The team visited at short notice to sites that basically did not belong to Al-Muthanna Establishment, and found no activities that contradict anything that Iraq had declared, except the announcement by the team of finding chemical equipment at the site of the sugar plant in Mosul. That equipment, in fact, belonged to Al-Muthanna Establishment, which had been evacuated and transferred to the sugar plant prior to the war, and had been reported to the first chemical inspection team. The Iraqi side is in possession of a vocal and visual recording through which the chief inspector of the first chemical inspection team, Dr. Dunn, was given this information. The team expressed regret that such sudden visits had to be made to sites not related to chemical activities, but pointed out that the purpose was to verify the information they had received from intelligence agencies and aerial surveying flights.

The aforementioned inspection teams carried out a complete survey of all facilities covered by resolution 687 (1991) which had direct or indirect relation to the production of chemical weapons, together with other sites that had no relation to chemical activities, as follows:

- The major site of Al-Muthanna Establishment in Samarra. The supplied information was verified with the actual situation. The chief inspectors of the inspection teams announced their satisfaction with the great cooperation provided by the Iraqi counterpart to facilitate the teams' work in all administrative and technical aspects.

- Other sites of Al-Muthanna Establishment (Fallouja 1, 2, 3) which are basically allocated for the production of agricultural pesticides and chlorine.

- Depots of Al-Muthanna Establishment in Al-Muhamadiyat, which were destroyed during the war.

- All airbases in which chemical ammunition was stored.

- The various declared and undeclared army ammunition stores.

- Various other undeclared sites, selected by the inspection teams, to verify non-existence of items related to chemical weapons.

- The inspection teams used cars as well as helicopters to verify the information.

- The Iraqi counterpart provided the inspection teams with various samples of non-filled ammunition at the rate of three pieces for each sample, which were sent to the Special Commission. The inspection team also took samples of the various chemical material, as well as chemical toxic agents for the purpose of analysis and verification of the information which were congruent with those provided by Iraq.

The biological aspect

14. Iraq's reaffirmation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925

Paragraph 7 of resolution 687 (1991) invited Iraq to reaffirm its obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons of 1972. Iraq announced its acceptance of resolution 687 (1991) in a letter sent by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General on 6 April 1991.

The Foreign Minister in his letter dated 18 April 1991 also reaffirmed unconditionally the obligations of the Iraqi Government under the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Iraq deposited on 8 April 1991, two days after its acceptance of resolution 687 (1991), its document of ratification of the Convention on prohibition of biclogical weapons of 1972.

15. Iraq's declaration of its research programme in the biological field

Paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq submit a declaration of the locations, amounts of all biological agents (pathogens), and their stocks and all related subsystems and components and all research and development facilities.

Iraq was not in possession of biological weapons, and accordingly has not submitted a declaration in this regard. On the other hand, Iraq had a research programme in the field of biological agents for defensive purposes, which Iraq had abandoned since the Autumn of 1990. Moreover, the site where the research was conducted was totally destroyed during the aggression against Iraq. Nevertheless, in order to check those who are dubious of Iraq's peaceful intentions and to foil the attempts designed to exploit this issue in order to continue the blockade imposed upon the people of Iraq and prepare for an aggression, Iraq declared its research programme in the biological field following the arrival of the first biological inspection team on 2 August 1991. The declaration which was notified to the inspection team included locating the site where the activity was carried out (the site of Al-Salman).

The inspection team visited this site and carried out on-site inspections

on all its facilities. The Iraqi side fully facilitated the team's tasks. It is worth noting that the site of Al-Salman was among the sites declared prior to the arrival of the first biological inspection team when the Special Commission inquired on 11 July 1991 on the types of systems for detecting and evaluating micro-organisms carried out in Iraq. This is evidence that proves Iraq's broadmindedness, cooperation and credibility and its keen desire not to conceal anything, even when having no direct relation with the context of resolution 687 (1991).

16. Submitting of biological material and information to the inspection teams

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq shall accept the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of all biological weapons and all stocks of biological weapons and all related subsystems, components and all research and development facilities.

Despite the non-possession by Iraq of what is demanded in resolution 687 (1991), the Iraqi side delivered to the first biological inspection team which visited Iraq from 3 to 9 August 1991, all the lyophilized living micro-organism strains which Iraq had imported from ATCC.

All the strains samples which have been used in the research were totally destroyed upon the escalation of threats to bomb the Iraqi scientific and economic facilities, to avoid environmental pollution with microbes.

The Iraqi side also delivered to the first biological inspection team all the completed researches related to the biological agents for military purposes which Iraq had implemented at Al-Salman site which was totally destroyed during the aggression perpetrated against Iraq. The Iraqi side also handed over to the first biological inspection team a list of the devices and equipment which had been evacuated to other locations. The team was further shown a fermentation device with a total capacity of 150 litres which was used for experiments and staff training, now that these devices (fermentors) have become among the basic devices that exist in microbiological laboratories, even the academic ones. The Iraqi counterpart also gave the team detailed maps of Al-Salman site and all its facilities. The Iraqi counterpart also responded to the demands of the inspection team by digging the buildings' foundations and facilitating the team's task to verify the number of floors in the buildings, and collect different samples from different sites. The Iraqi counterpart complied with the demands by the inspection team not to move, lift or remove anything from the site, including the stores belonging to the military units. During their task in the site of Al-Salman which lasted eight days, the inspection team surveyed, explored and took samples from the sites and thoroughly discussed with the Iraqi technicians the research programme for defensive purposes. The Iraqi technicians fully cooperated with the inspection team and facilitated the team's access to all matters they required. The discussions were completely clear, frank and credible. The press release issued by the Special Commission on 14 August 1991 on the visit of the first biological inspection team said, "No evidence was obtained on the presence of biological weapons or weapons filling facilities". The statement

issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 5 August 1991 on the visit of the first biological inspection team to Iraq also stated that "The Iraqi authorities cooperated excellently with the team".

Meanwhile, the first biological inspection team delivered to the Iraqi counterpart a number of questions to which the latter replied on 21 August 1991 in a letter in 24 pages that contained details on the micro-organism on which research was conducted in the laboratory of biological researches for military purposes, as well as detailed information on the Iraqi bodies and establishments which deal with activities related to medicines, vaccines, serums and biological researches. The letter also contained a list of the biological researches which had been completed at the Iraqi universities in 1988, 1989 and 1990.

17. The facilitation of the inspection teams' tasks

The second biological inspection team visited Iraq during the period 20 September-3 October 1991. The Iraqi counterpart fully cooperated with the team, which inspected 10 sites including declared and undeclared sites. Four of these inspection tours were carried out without prior notice. The sites inspected by the team included Samarra drug factory where the team saw all the operations and activities carried out and the process of drug formulation. The team spent two days in search and inspection, and thorough scientific discussions were conducted on the activities of the drug factory. The team was shown all the equipment which are used for drug formulation in the factory and did not find any equipment for the purpose of fermentation, the production of antibiotics or any other activities that run contrary to resolution 687 (1991). The Iraqi counterpart supplied the team with a list of the imported lyophilized micro-organisms strains for the purpose of evaluation and quality control.

The second inspection team also visited the veterinary vaccines production site and the site for the production of foot-and-mouth-disease vaccines and inspected all the equipment and apparatuses therein, as well as the nature of the site and its laboratories which represent the containment laboratories. These laboratories were evaluated by the inspection team as having the specifications of second and third degree containment laboratories.

The inspection team also received a number of virus strains for the foot and mouth fever as well as a number of the vaccines produced at the site. The team was shown all the detailed drawings for the site and also received a list of imports. The second biological inspection team also visited a destroyed site for the production of veterinary vaccines, which is the site of Al-Kindy Company, a private sector concern. The said site was almost totally destroyed during the aggression against Iraq. The inspection team received samples of the products and strains used in the production of vaccines and thoroughly inspected its research laboratories, imports and origins of the imported materials and equipment used for the production of vaccines. The inspection team received a group of samples of the produced vaccines for the evaluation. The team also inspected the serums and vaccines institute that specialized in

the production of human vaccines and storing imported vaccines and their distribution in the country according to the need, and saw all its laboratory research and production equipment and apparatuses. The inspection team discussed with the Iraqi counterpart the institute's activities in detail, and received lists and samples of the bacteria strains used in the production as well as samples of the produced vaccines and lists of imported material and vaccines. The team promised to facilitate the task of the institute in acquiring vaccines and the material required for their production.

The second biological inspection team visited a site for the production of single-cell protein (Al-Hakam site) and inspected all the instruments, equipment, laboratories and other facilities. The team discussed thoroughly with the Iraqi technical staff and in detail the activities of the site and the initial start of this activity in Iraq from the beginning of 1975. The team also inspected the first experimental factory for this activity, which is situated at Al-Taji area. The team was shown the related researches which had been completed during the period 1978-1982. The inspection team also took samples of all instruments, equipment and soil at Al-Hakam site, and also received samples of the yeasts used for experimental production and research purposes. The team was also shown the apparatuses and equipment which had been evacuated from Salman Pak site and transferred to Al-Hakam site. Among the undeclared sites which the team visited suddenly and without prior notice were the flour and bread factory in Al-Najaf town, Al-Dora slaughterhouse and cooling stores which contain frozen meat for civilian consumption and the blood bank in Baghdad. In all their sudden visits the teams did not find anything contrary to Iraq's declarations. The inspection team also visited a site for agricultural and water resources research that belonged to the Scientific Research Council which has been abolished. The team was shown an experimental factory for the production of yeasts from carbohydrates (dates juice). The said factory is abolished.

Following the completion of its visit to Iraq, the team published its report on the visit in 24 October 1991. The report says: "The team found no biological weapons or warheads or warhead filling facilities. Nor did the team find evidence, in all the ten sites they visited, that weapon-grade biological agents have been produced." Paragraph 12 of the report also says: "The Iraqi counterpart was cooperative. The warm hospitality to the inspection team was invaluable."

18. The sudden visits of the inspection teams

The joint chemical-biological inspection team visited Iraq during the period 18 November-1 December 1991. This team adopted the method of sudden visits and visited 13 sites not related to the biological aspect. The team also used helicopters in surveying the sites, and did not find anything that runs contrary to resolution 687 (1991). This inspection corroborated Iraq's statements to the effect that it abandoned the biological activity for defensive purposes in Autumn 1990, and is not in possession of any biological weapons. It is worthwhile noting that this team has also been searching for undeclared sites for missiles and chemical weapons, but found none.

19. Meetings of the Iraqi side with the inspection teams

During the visit of the inspection teams, several meetings were held between these teams and representatives from some Iraqi Ministries such as Health, Agriculture and Oil. Experts in the Ministries of Health and Agriculture provided accurate details on their imports of vaccines and diagnostic materials and instruments as well as their activities in time periods carried out up to 1988; while the Ministry of Oil's experts explained Iraq's factual interest in the production of single-cell protein from oil derivatives. The discussions were also attended by Iraqi officials in order to clarify administrative and technical details to the inspection teams and to answer all their queries to provide a lucid and clear atmosphere that would serve to remove ambiguities and dismiss any suspicion by the inspection team. Iraq has provided answers to all queries it received from the Special Commission pertinent to providing the required information on all the sites, whether those related to fermentation or vaccines production, or those housing laboratories that meet the specifications of a containment laboratory. The Iraqi side also gave details on its vaccination programmes, whether for civilians or military troops, and gave details on all its importation programmes.

20. The undertaking not to develop biological weapons

Paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire biological weapons.

Iraq has undertaken same through its ratification of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons of 1972. The inspection teams have verified this undertaking and found nothing that runs counter to the Iraqi declarations. The team ascertained the following:

(a) Iraq has not produced biological weapons.

(b) There has been one site for research in Salman area which was totally destroyed during the aggression.

(c) Iraq totally abandoned research activity prior to the beginning of the military operations.

The ballistic missiles aspect

21. Providing information on the ballistic missiles

Paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq submit information on the ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled the procedures required under this paragraph as follows:

(a) On 18 April 1991, Iraq declared, and supported with coordinations, all the items contained in paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991). The information comprised the following:

- 52 Scud missiles;

- 23 Scud conventional warheads;

- 30 Scud chemical warheads;

- Accessories, support systems for the missiles systems such as launching vehicles, test vehicles, fuel and oxidizer supply vehicles;

- 6 mobile Scud missile launchers of different types;

- 28 stationary launching pads.

Despite the fact that this declaration included the basic information required by resolution 687 (1991), it has not indicated any secondary matters owing to pressure of time and the abnormal circumstance that ensued following the aggression, such as the paralysis suffered by telephone communications and refineries which resulted in complex problems in communications and transport that prevented the gathering of information from some remotely located sites. This information was supplied as soon as the Iraqi side reached the sites and verified their contents as follows:

- On 25 April 1991, a declaration was made on four mobile launchers, destroyed in the western region.

- On 2 May 1991 a declaration was made on four Russian mobile launchers in addition to those declared on 18 April.

- On 16 May 1991, the Special Commission was notified of five locations for storage of missiles, launchers and support units as well as five sites for production, testing, development and modification.

- On 19 May 1991, the Special Commission was notified of the research and development plan for the missiles (Fahad 300, Fahad 500, Al-Hijara, Condor, Al-Abbas, Tammouz and the long-range gun). Nine Fahad missiles which were covered by the research and development plan were also declared.

(b) On 18 July 1991 the Government of Iraq declared the long-range gun for research and development purposes as well as three sites where the major components existed, as research and development sites. Despite the fact that the long-range gun was still in the research and development stage and was not completed owing to the embargo imposed against the imported parts, and it was a weapon not ready for operation, and although it was not covered by the

requirements of resolution 687 (1991), the Special Commission was informed of this research project and all its details as a gesture of good will and to avoid allegations.

22. The destruction of ballistic missiles

Paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq destroy, remove or render harmless the ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled this procedure, and the inspection team verified the Iraqi declarations and supervised the destruction of the missiles, mobile launchers and related major parts, as well as the stationary launching pads, support vehicles such as transport vehicles and vehicles for the supply of fuel and oxidizer, warheads, missiles containers, and tools and special dyes of production as follows:

(a) The first missile inspection team: Visited Iraq during the period 30 June-7 July 1991. This team inspected five declared sites as well as two sites that are not related to the context of resolution 687 (1991). During this visit, the team supervised the destruction of the missiles, their systems and the mobile launchers.

(b) The second missile inspection team (18-20 July 1991): The team visited six different sites including military sites at Al-Taji camp and around it. They found structures of decoy missiles and some missile containers. The team asked their destruction, which was effected in the presence of the team members.

(c) The third missile inspection team (8-15 August 1991): The team visited seven declared sites. Among the declared sites visited by the team were the production sites at Al-Taji, the long-range gun site and production sites of the missile (Badr 2000). The team also made sudden visits to six sites not covered by resolution 687 (1991) and found no activities incompatible with the resolution. The Iraqi counterpart provided the team with additional documents and information related to the long-range gun and answered queries by the team.

(d) The fourth missile inspection team (6-13 September 1991): The team visited five military sites in different areas and ordered the destruction of missile transport vehicles, which had been cut off under the supervision of a previous team to be then rewelded to be used for civilian purposes. The team also asked the destruction of some empty and abandoned fuel tanks. The destruction was carried out under the team's supervision.

(e) The fifth missile inspection team (1-14 October 1991): The team visited the sites of the stationary launching pads in the western region and supervised the destruction of all the stationary launching pads in the western region and the destruction of the long-range gun and its major parts. During this visit the team made 16 visits to undeclared sites and found no activity

incompatible with resolution 687 (1991) except for some concrete structures which were destroyed under the team's supervision.

(f) The sixth missile inspection team (1-9 December 1991): The team inspected the western region to verify the destruction of the stationary pads. The team also visited Al-Kindy Establishment in Mosul, Salahuddin Establishment in Al-Dour, Nasr Establishment and Al-Mutawakil project near Baghdad, and found nothing contrary to Iraq's declarations. The team asked that some equipment not be moved.

(g) The seventh missile inspection team (9-17 December 1991): The team visited the ammunition depots in Haditha and the western region, and also made on 10 December a sudden visit to sites that are not related to the resolution, i.e. the Directorate of Baghdad Police, Al-Zawra Sports Club and Al-Karkh Education Directorate. The team found nothing contrary to Iraq's declaration.

23. Undertaking not to develop ballistic missiles

Paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.

Iraq has fulfilled this through abandoning any activity related to the use or the development of ballistic missiles referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 687 (1991). The seven ballistic missile inspection teams have practically verified such compliance when they found during their tours nothing that runs contrary to such compliance, particularly when their inspection tour covered the military camps, production sites, industrial facilities, airbases, military depots and civil sites, in addition to the aerial surveying carried out by some of those teams of several widespread areas, such as the western region, using helicopters.

Return of Kuwaiti property

24. Paragraph 15 of resolution 687 (1991) "requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact".

In implementation of this paragraph and of the Secretary-General's report connected with it, the Iraqi Government has fulfilled the following:

(a) According to the agreement reached, in June 1991, with Mr. J. Richard Foran, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of coordinating the return of Kuwaiti property, four priorities were determined for the return of Kuwaiti property and assets, which have been fulfilled as follows:

In May 1991, the Iraqi side delivered to the Kuwaiti side, via United Nations representatives, a civil aircraft in Amman, Jordan. Another civil aircraft was delivered at Muthana airport in Baghdad on 31 July 1991.

On 5 August 1991, 3,216 gold ingots and amounts of banknotes began to be delivered to the Kuwaiti side at Arar in Saudi Arabia under United Nations supervision. This operation took nearly a month to be completed.

On 17 September 1991, the books belonging to the Kuwaiti Central Library were delivered to the Kuwaiti side at Arar in Saudi Arabia under United Nations supervision.

On 16 September 1991, nearly 17,000 Kuwaiti museum pieces began to be handed over to Kuwaiti representatives at the Iraqi National Museum Building in Baghdad. The operation, which was done under United Nations supervision, lasted for over a month and was completed on 20 October 1991. The items were sent back by air via Habaniyah Airport in Iraq.

(b) While delivery of the above-mentioned items and materials was in progress, negotiation was under way regarding the technical measures and timetable required for the remaining items to be delivered. Other deliveries have, in fact, been made, and these are as follows:

On 17 September 1991, items belonging to the Kuwaiti News Agency were delivered under United Nations supervision at Arar in Saudi Arabia.

On 13 November 1991, nine Boeing and Airbus aircraft engines were delivered to the Kuwaiti side by air from Habaniyah Airport under United Nations supervision.

On 15 December, 16 steel safes belonging to the Kuwaiti Central Bank were delivered to the Kuwaiti side and flown back to Kuwait on the same day under United Nations supervision.

(c) In addition to the deliveries made during the past four months, Iraq received, during the second half of December 1991, a technical delegation to examine the aircraft destroyed at Mosul and Muthana airports and to check the Hawk and Skyhawk aircraft, of which four Hawk military training aircraft were delivered on 15 December 1991.

(d) Iraq has expressed readiness to hand over the Hawk missile system and other military equipment about which coordination was being conducted with Assistant Secretary-General Richard Foran, for delivery to be made at Safwan in mid-January 1992.

25. While Iraq continues to extend its fullest cooperation to United Nations representatives in connection with the return of Kuwaiti property, a number of Iraqi Ministries and authorities remain ready and prepared to return the

property and materials which are in their possession, and of which official inventories have been prepared and submitted to the United Nations Coordinator, with a view to agreeing on the technical measures required for delivery to be made. These Ministries and authorities include:

(a) The Ministry of Defence, for which a date has been set in principle for deliveries to be made in mid-January 1992 at Safwan in the demilitarized zone.

(b) The Iraqi Airways Company, for which a date has been set in principle for the delivery of spare-parts to be made in mid-January 1992.

(c) The Ministry of Health, in respect of which the Iraqi side still awaits a date and a place to be set for deliveries to be made according to the inventories presented to Mr. Foran.

(d) The Ministry of Transport and Communications, in respect of which the Iraqi side still expects a delivery date to be fixed as well as awaiting the arrival of spare-parts, ordered in agreement with the Kuwaiti side, for the repair of boat-towing carriages.

(e) The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs still awaits a date and a place to be fixed for the delivery of materials.

26. The Iraqi side has asked Assistant Secretary-General Foran to inform the President of the Security Council, officially and in writing, of the deliveries already taken by the Kuwaiti side of the above-mentioned property and materials, and to ask that his communications to the Security Council be regarded as United Nations documents.

27. It ought to be mentioned that had it not been for the shortage in United Nations staff, it might have been possible to conduct the return of property and materials simultaneously at several delivery-points, with a view to ensuring the quick return of as much property as possible.

Iraq reiterates its willingness to see its various Ministries and authorities get the chance they need to return the property they have in a simultaneous manner, once sufficient staff is made available among United Nations representatives and on the Kuwaiti side. The items and equipment are ready for delivery according to the inventories presented to Assistant Secretary-General Foran.

Repatriation of Kuwaiti and third country nationals

28. Paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991) demands that, in order to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, "Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located

or detained and facilitating the search of the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for."

In implementation of that paragraph, the Iraqi Government took the following steps:

(a) Iraq, for its part, has honoured all its international obligations fully and in earnest, with regard to facilitating the repatriation of all Kuwaiti nationals accepted by the Kuwaiti authorities as well as the third country nationals. Iraq has also extended all cooperation required to the International Committee of the Red Cross in connection with these nationals wherever they are located.

(b) In fact, the Iraqi authorities concerned have, since 4 March 1991, and in cooperation with the ICRC mission in Baghdad, repatriated 6,518 Kuwaiti and other third country nationals, both military and civilian. There are at present 3,905 Kuwaitis in Iraq; and these are not kept in detention, but live freely and move about without restriction all over the country. They have enjoyed access to the ICRC mission in Baghdad where they can register their names and submit, of their own free will and without interference from the Iraqi authorities, their requests for repatriation to Kuwait. From the very beginning, the ICRC mission asked the Kuwaiti authorities to approve their return; but the Kuwaiti authorities have so far agreed to the return of only 400 of the entire number. We are still awaiting Kuwaiti approval for the rest to be repatriated, so that we can immediately carry out the repatriation under the ICRC supervision.

(c) The Government of the Republic of Iraq has approved of all the points discussed during the Geneva meeting held on 16-17 October 1991, between the Iraqi delegation and the delegations of the coalition countries. Those points include:

- Printing and publishing the names of the missing Kuwaitis and Saudis in an Iraqi newspaper in search of any information about them or their whereabouts.

- Providing the ICRC with lists of detention and prison locations, so that the ICRC can visit these places and locations.

- Visits to detention centres and prisons in search of missing Kuwaitis and Saudis will be conducted in coordination with the Iraqi authorities concerned as well as the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(d) The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that reciprocation be observed in the implementation of the said measures in both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, regarding the search for Iraqi nationals missing therein.

29. On 17 December 1991, the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a request to the ICRC mission in Baghdad in which the Ministry proposed that the ICRC prepare a complete implementation plan, to be agreed upon between Iraq and the coalition countries, for ways and measures to be adopted in the search for Kuwaiti, Saudi, Iraqi and other nationals still missing, in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

30. Paragraph 32 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) "requires Iraq to inform the Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism".

In demonstration of Iraq's firm stand against terrorism, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a letter, on 11 June 1991, to the President of the Security Council in which the Minister informed the President of the Security Council that Iraq thereby registered its firm rejection of international terrorism and of all forms of violence threatening the lives and freedoms of innocent people and endangering their safety and stability. The Minister also referred in his letter to the relevant international conventions to which Iraq has been party since 1963, to the fact that the Republic of Iraq has never pursued or condoned any course of action connected with the criminal policy of international terrorism as defined by international law, and that Iraq never allows any organization to perpetrate such acts from its territory.

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S/23473
27 January 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the numbers and types of bombs and other ordnance that were launched against residential areas in Iraq in the course of the brutal 30-Power aggression, which did not explode at the time and which have been recorded by the competent Iraqi authorities.

I transmit herewith two lists. The first shows a breakdown of the total number of 181,812 bombs, missiles and rockets that were found and disposed of in the various parts of Iraq between 17 January 1991 and 16 January 1992. The second list shows the types of bombs and missiles involved.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sabah Talat KADRAT
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex I

Number of bombs, missiles and rockets dealt with by disposal teams in the country's governorates between 17 January 1991 and 16 January 1992

No.	Governorate	Number
1	Baghdad	3 366
2	Ninawa	4 552
3	Basra	101 436
4	Babil	5 429
5	Najaf	4 975
6	Karbala	821
7	Anbar	22 474
8	Maysan	3 857
9	Salah al-Din	7 607
10	Diyala	74
11	Wasit	3 773
12	Ta'mim	4 690
13	Dhi Qar	7 416
14	Qadisiyah	9 317
15	Muthanna	2 025
	Total	181 812

Annex II

Types of bombs and missiles launched against the country by the coalition forces and dealt with by explosive ordnance disposal teams

1. Bombs

(a) 2,000-pound Mk 84 bombs fitted with M905E2 and M905E4 mechanical delayed fuzes and M904E2 mechanical advanced fuzes.

(b) 1,000-pound Mk 82 bombs fitted with FMU/391B electronic fuzes.

(c) 750-pound M 117 bombs fitted with mechanical delayed fuzes, such as M904E4, and FMU 54A/B electric fuzes and FMU139A/B and FMU54A/B electronic fuzes, and mechanical advanced fuzes such as the M904.

(d) 750-pound Mk 40 Mod 0 and Mk 40 Mod 87 bombs.

(e) 500-pound Mk 82 Mod 2 bombs fitted with M904E2 advanced fuzes and mechanical and electrical delayed fuzes, such as the M905E2 and M905E4, and the FMU54A/B electric fuze.

(f) 250-pound bombs.

(g) B/U 97/B, B/U 97A/B and B/U-3A/A anti-personnel cluster bombs.

(h) CBU52/B/B and CBU71/B ball-bearing bombs.

(i) I0P88M042-019 electronic area denial bombs.

(j) Aerial mines.

(k) Anti-runway cluster bombs fitted with parachute.

(l) Sprung fragmentation bombs.

(m) KAWANA fragmentation bombs.

(n) Napalm dispensers.

(o) Decoy fibreglass-chaff dispensers.

2. Missiles

(a) 960 Mk 1 cruise guided-missiles.

(b) Spiro air-to-surface missiles.

(c) Area denial and anti-runway air-to-surface missiles.

(d) M72 A2 66-millimetre missiles.

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S/23474
24 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 JANUARY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I refer to your conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister Genscher in which he expressed the deep concern of the German Government about the danger of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially of the possible illegal spread and misuse of know-how concerning their development and production. The German Government deems it important that all States Members of the United Nations join in a collective effort to address this growing threat to international peace and security. It is essential that our efforts take full advantage of the expertise and energy of all Member States and that they be based on a wide consensus.

Allow me to summarize the three proposals which Minister Genscher suggested the United Nations explore:

- To create incentives for scientists and experts currently involved in the development or production of weapons of mass destruction to use their knowledge for peaceful purposes. Specifically, an international foundation for peaceful technology could be established, offering them employment, research or training contracts.

- To invite Member States to enact strict domestic legislation banning the participation of their nationals in the development or production of the weapons of mass destruction - whether at home or abroad. The German Parliament has just enacted new and stricter laws providing for criminal prosecution of German nationals participating in any such activities. An international convention could be elaborated whose parties would undertake to enact similar domestic legislation.

- To enact sanctions against States that try to procure the material or the technology for weapons of mass destruction. The only body empowered to do that is the United Nations Security Council. The Council could take up the matter of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to international peace and security. In a

resolution, the Security Council could embrace the above-mentioned and possible further elements of the initiative and could, in particular, declare that breaches of the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or comparable obligations of international law constitute a threat to international peace and security against which the Security Council will impose adequate sanctions.

I would greatly appreciate it if you could arrange for this letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Detlev GRAF ZU RANTZAU
Ambassador

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23475
24 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3035th meeting on 23 January 1992, the Security Council had before it the application of the Republic of Armenia (S/23405) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 79th meeting on 24 January 1992, the Committee considered the application of the Republic of Armenia and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that the Republic of Armenia should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

The Security Council,

Having examined the application of the Republic of Armenia for admission to the United Nations (S/23405),

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Armenia be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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S/23476
24 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KYRGYZSTAN FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3036th meeting on 23 January 1992, the Security Council had before it the application of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan (S/23450) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 80th meeting on 24 January 1992, the Committee considered the application of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that the Republic of Kyrgyzstan should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

The Security Council,

Having examined the application of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan for admission to the United Nations (S/23450),

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Kyrgyzstan be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/23477
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3037th meeting on 23 January 1992, the Security Council had before it the application of the Republic of Uzbekistan (S/23451) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 81st meeting on 24 January 1992, the Committee considered the application of the Republic of Uzbekistan and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that the Republic of Uzbekistan should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

The Security Council,

Having examined the application of the Republic of Uzbekistan for admission to the United Nations (S/23451),

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Uzbekistan be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

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Security Council

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24 January 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN FOR ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. At the 3038th meeting on 23 January 1992, the Security Council had before it the application of the Republic of Tajikistan (S/23455) for admission to membership in the United Nations. In accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and in the absence of a proposal to the contrary, the President of the Council referred the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report.

2. At its 82nd meeting on 24 January 1992, the Committee considered the application of the Republic of Tajikistan and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that the Republic of Tajikistan should be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

3. The Committee further decided to recommend to the Security Council that it should have recourse to the provision of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure.

4. Accordingly, the Committee recommends to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution:

The Security Council,

Having examined the application of the Republic of Tajikistan for admission to the United Nations (S/23455),

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Tajikistan be admitted to membership in the United Nations.